

# Notes V - Heterogeneous Agents & Incomplete Markets

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# Motivation

- ▶ Why heterogeneity may be important:
  1. Aggregation bias.
  2. Heterogeneity in decisions and its impact on aggregates.

## So Far...

- ▶ We have already analyzed heterogeneity:
  - ▶ Equilibrium endowment economy with a complete set of state-contingent securities.
  - ▶ Also, in some of the extensions of the RBC model.
  - ▶ Heterogeneity “didn’t matter” since idiosyncratic shocks can be insured away.
    - ▶ Wealth distribution has no impact on aggregate dynamics.
- ▶ These models are useful but we cannot study distributional issues.
  - ▶ In this sense, complete markets are at odds with the data.
    - ▶ We will have to depart from them.

# These Lectures

- ▶ We will assume that there is not a complete set of stage-contingent securities.
  - ▶ Incomplete-markets model.
- ▶ With aggregate shocks, this leads to important computational difficulties.
- ▶ To simplify, we will consider:
  - ▶ Only idiosyncratic shocks with exogenous restrictions on available assets.
- ▶ Agents will be *ex ante* homogenous.
  - ▶ But they cannot insure away all idiosyncratic risk.
    - ▶ They are *ex post* heterogeneous.

# Why is This Difficult?

- ▶ In the models so far the Welfare theorems apply.
  - ▶ First best could be achieved by a competitive equilibrium.
    - ▶ Solving the Social Planner allocation was enough.
- ▶ With incomplete markets this is not the case.
  - ▶ We need to solve the competitive equilibrium.
    - ▶ This, among other things, requires solving for prices.
  - ▶ Dynamics and uncertainty will be different for individuals and the aggregate economy.
- ▶ With heterogeneous agents, the distribution of asset holdings is non-degenerate.
  - ▶ It becomes a state variable.
    - ▶ And it is an infinite object.

# Preliminaries: Self-Insurance

# Precautionary Motive and Buffer Stock

- ▶ With quadratic preferences nothing “bad” happens when consumption goes very low.
- ▶ With non-quadratic preferences, we will have a relevant third moment:
  - ▶  $U''' > 0$  known as “prudence” .
    - ▶ Curvature of the marginal utility function.
- ▶ Prudence is a motive for additional savings:
  - ▶ *Precautionary motive or self-insure.*
    - ▶ Consumption is expected to grow even if  $\rho = r$ .
  - ▶ If  $\rho > r$  agents accumulate a “buffer stock” until precautionary motive is dominated by the agent’s relative impatience.
    - ▶ Why would we like to focus on this case?

# Borrowing Constraints

- ▶ Two types of borrowing limits:
  1. *Natural borrowing constraint.*
    - ▶ The constraint self-imposed by the agent.
  2. *Ad-hoc.*
- ▶ Ad-hoc constraints are more stringent.
  - ▶ With prudence, a natural borrowing constraint will never bind.
- ▶ Ad hoc borrowing constraints will change our previous result:
  - ▶ There will be precautionary savings with quadratic utility.



## Borrowing Constraints and Quadratic Utility

- ▶ Household can buy (or borrow, by selling) a riskless asset,  $a$ , that has a real interest  $r$ .
- ▶ Household's problem is:

$$\max_{\{c_t, a_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t)$$

subject to:

$$c_t + a_{t+1} = (1 + r)a_t + y_t$$
$$a_t \geq \phi$$

- ▶ What is  $c_t$  equal to with quadratic preferences and  $\phi = 0$ ?

### Result:

*Even in the absence of prudence, in presence of borrowing constraints a rise in future income uncertainty leads to a rise in current savings and decline in current consumption.*

# Inspecting the Mechanism

- ▶ In the previous problem define “cash in hand”,  $x_t$ , as

$$x_t = (1 + r)a_t + y_t$$

- ▶ Assuming  $y_t$  is i.i.d., we can then write the problem as:

$$V(x_t) = \max_{c_t, x_{t+1}} u(c_t) + \frac{1}{1 + \rho} \mathbb{E}_t V(x_{t+1})$$

subject to:

$$x_{t+1} = (1 + r)(x_t - c_t) + y_{t+1}$$

$$x_t - c_t \geq \phi$$

- ▶ The borrowing constraint adds convexity to the problem.
  - ▶ The buffer stock saving with quadratic utility is driven by the ad hoc constraint.

# Heterogeneous Agents Models

# Bewley-Aiyagari Models

- ▶ Earlier models:
  - ▶ Bewley (1977).
  - ▶ Imrohoroğlu (1989).
- ▶ GE:
  - ▶ Huggett (1993).
  - ▶ Aiyagari (1994).
  - ▶ Krusell and Smith (1998).

# Heterogeneous Agents Models

- ▶ We get away from the representative agent model.
  - ▶ We will assume incomplete markets.
    - ▶ To simplify: we rule out state-contingent securities completely.
- ▶ We will cover two versions of Bewley models:
  1. Huggett (1993): Endowment economy with bonds in zero net supply.
  2. Aiyagari (1994): Production economy.

# Households' Problem

- ▶ There is a unit measure of infinitely-lived households solving:

$$\max_{\{c_t, a_{t+1} \in \mathcal{A}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} u(c_t)$$

subject to:

$$c_t + a_{t+1} = (1 + r)a_t + w \cdot s_t$$
$$a_0 \text{ given}$$

- ▶  $s_t$  can be interpreted as the worker's labor effort.
  - ▶  $m$ -state Markov process with values given by vector  $\bar{s}$  and transition matrix  $\mathcal{P}$ .
    - ▶ Model's source of uncertainty.
- ▶ Notice that  $a_{t+1}$  is constrained to be on a grid.
  - ▶ There is a borrowing limit.

▶ Back to Aiyagari's.

# Bellman Equation

$$V(a_h, \bar{s}_i) = \max_{a' \in \mathcal{A}} u \left[ (1+r)a_h + w\bar{s}_i - a' \right] + \beta \sum_{j=1}^m \mathcal{P}(i,j) V(a', \bar{s}_j)$$

- ▶ Solving the Bellman generates a decision rule:  $a' = g(a, s)$

# Wealth-Employment Distributions

- ▶ Define unconditional distribution of  $(a_t, s_t)$  pairs:

$$\lambda_t(a, s) = \Pr(a_t = a, s_t = s)$$

- ▶ With our assumptions, this gives us the distribution of agents over the state space.
- ▶ The law of motion for this distribution is:

$$\begin{aligned}\lambda_{t+1}(a', s') &= \sum_{j=1}^m \sum_{i=1}^n \Pr(a_t = a_i, s_t = \bar{s}_j) \cdot \Pr(s_{t+1} = s' | s_t = \bar{s}_j) \\ &\quad \cdot \Pr(a_{t+1} = a' | a_t = a_i, s_t = \bar{s}_j) \\ &= \sum_{j=1}^m \sum_{i=1}^n \lambda_t(a_i, \bar{s}_j) \cdot \Pr(s_{t+1} = s' | s_t = \bar{s}_j) \cdot \mathcal{I}(a' | a_i, \bar{s}_j) \\ &= \sum_{j=1}^m \sum_{\{i: a' = g(a_i, \bar{s}_j)\}} \lambda_t(a_i, \bar{s}_j) \cdot \Pr(s_{t+1} = s' | s_t = \bar{s}_j)\end{aligned}$$



- ▶ The law of motion depends on:
  1.  $g(a, s)$ .
  2.  $\mathcal{P}$ .
- ▶ We can calculate an invariant distribution.
- ▶ About  $\lambda$ .
  - ▶ The cross-section distribution of agents remains constant.
  - ▶ For a given  $r$  the population mean

$$\mathbb{E}(a)(r) = \sum_{a,s} \lambda(a, s)g(a, s)$$

Can be interpreted in two ways:

1. Across-time.
2. Across households.

# Huggett's "Pure Credit" Model

- ▶ Huggett (1993).
- ▶ Pure exchange economy.
  - ▶ Model is closed out by assuming that the bonds are in zero net supply.
- ▶ There is a lower bound on assets given by  $a_i = -\phi$ .
- ▶ Interest rate,  $r$ , will adjust to equate borrowing and lending.
- ▶ Wages are still set exogenously.

# Equilibrium in the Huggett Model

## Definition (Stationary Equilibrium)

Given  $\phi$ , a stationary equilibrium is an interest rate  $r$ , a policy function  $g(a, s)$ , and a stationary distribution  $\lambda(a, s)$  for which

1. The policy function  $g(a, s)$  solves the household's optimization problem;
2. The stationary distribution  $\lambda(a, s)$  is induced by the  $(\mathcal{P}, \bar{s})$  and  $g(a, s)$ , satisfying

$$\lambda(a', s') = \sum_{j=1}^m \sum_{\{i: a' = g(a_i, \bar{s}_j)\}} \text{Prob}(s' | s = \bar{s}_j) \cdot \lambda(a_i, \bar{s}_j)$$

3. The loan market clears:

$$\sum_{a, s} \lambda(a, s) g(a, s) = 0$$

# Huggett's Equilibrium Computation

1. Fix  $r = r_j$  for  $j = 0$ .
2. Solve household's problem for  $g_j(a, s)$ .
3. Calculate associated  $\lambda_j(a, s)$ .

4. Compute

$$\sum_{a,s} \lambda(a, s) g(a, s) = e_j^*$$

5. If  $e_j^* > 0$ , lower  $r$ .
6. Forward to  $j + 1$  and repeat until  $e_j^* = 0$

# Aiyagari's Production Economy

- ▶ Aiyagari (1994).
- ▶ Households now save by buying capital.
  - ▶ Call it  $k$  instead of  $a$ .
- ▶ Representative firm pays:
  - ▶  $\tilde{r}$  for the rental rate of capital.
  - ▶  $w$  for the households' labor effort.
- ▶ Capital depreciates at  $\delta$ .
  - ▶ Could be mapped into baseline model. ▶ Baseline

# Equilibrium in the Aiyagari Model

## Definition (Stationary Equilibrium)

A stationary equilibrium is a decision rule  $g(k, s)$ , a probability distribution  $\lambda(k, s)$ , a rental rate  $\tilde{r}$ , a wage  $w$ , a capital stock  $K$ , and an aggregate quantity of labor  $N$  such that

1. The policy function  $g(k, s)$  solves the household's optimization problem with the return on capital given by  $r = \tilde{r} - \delta$ ;
2. The stationary distribution  $\lambda(a, s)$  is induced by  $(\mathcal{P}, \bar{s})$  and  $g(a, s)$ , satisfying

$$\lambda(k', s') = \sum_{j=1}^m \sum_{\{i: k'=g(k_i, \bar{s}_j)\}}^n \text{Prob}(s'|s = \bar{s}_j) \cdot \lambda(k_i, \bar{s}_j)$$

3. The aggregate factors of production are given by

$$K = \sum_{k,s} \lambda(k, s) g(k, s)$$

$$N = \zeta'_{\infty} \bar{s}$$

where  $\zeta'_{\infty}$  is the invariant distribution associated with  $(\mathcal{P}, \bar{s})$ ;

4. The prices satisfy

$$w = F_N(K, N) \quad \text{and} \quad r = F_K(K, N) - \delta$$

# Aiyagari's Equilibrium Computation

1. Set initial value of aggregate capital stock,  $K_0$ .
2. For the current iterate  $j$ , calculate the factor prices as  
 $w_j = F_N(K_j, N), \quad r_j = F_K(K_j, N)$
3. Given the factor prices, solve the Bellman equation, which yields the decision rule  $g_j(k, s)$ .
4. Find the stationary distribution  $\lambda_j(k, s)$ .
  - 4.1 Start with an initial distribution.
  - 4.2 Move the mass of agents at each point in the state space to a new location in the state space, using  $g_j(k, s)$  and the Markov process for  $s$ .
  - 4.3 Iterate to convergence.
5. Calculate

$$K_j^* = \sum_{k,s} \lambda_j(k_i, \bar{s}_h) g_j(k_i, \bar{s}_h)$$

6. Set the next iteration of aggregate capital as

$$K_{j+1} = \mu K_j^* + (1 - \mu) K_j$$

where  $\mu$  is the relative weight on  $K_j^*$  in the updating formula

7. Iterate until  $K_j^*$  is sufficiently close to  $K_j$ .

# Additional Comments

- ▶ We can represent both models into a unified diagram.
  - ▶ Where is the buffer stock?
  - ▶ What are the effects of relaxing the constraint?
  - ▶ Capital is higher under incomplete markets.
    - ▶ What about welfare?
- ▶ How can we think about the lower bound of the grid?



# Heterogeneous Agent's With Aggregate Risk

- ▶ There will no longer be a stationary distribution.
  - ▶ Stationary equilibrium can no longer be the solution concept.
- ▶ The distribution  $\lambda_t(k, s)$  also becomes part of the state space.
  - ▶ Agents need to know that to forecast future factor prices.
  - ▶ *Curse of dimensionality*.
- ▶ Krusell and Smith (1998) propose a computational approach.